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Historical and current research on borderline personality 
disorder reveal certain affinities with schizophrenia spec-
trum psychopathology. This is also the case for the bord-
erline criteria of “identity disturbance” and “feelings 
of emptiness,” which reflect symptomatology frequently 
found in schizophrenia and schizotypal personality dis-
order. Unfortunately, the diagnostic manuals offer limited 
insight into the nature of these criteria, including possible 
deviations and similarities with schizophrenia spectrum 
symptomatology. In this article, we attempt to clarify the 
concepts of identity disturbance and feelings of emptiness 
with an emphasis on the criteria’s differential diagnostic 
significance. Drawing on contemporary philosophy, we 
distinguish between a “narrative” self and a “core” self, 
suggesting that this distinction may assist differential diag-
nostic efforts and contribute to mark the psychopatholog-
ical boundaries of these disorders.
Key words:  borderline/schizotypal/self-disorders/ 
core self/narrative self
Introduction
Borderline personality disorder (BPD) became an of-
ficial diagnosis in 19801 and its prevalence among psy-
chiatric inpatients is now reported to be about 20%.2 
Concomitantly, there has been a decline in the use of the 
hebephrenia (disorganized schizophrenia) diagnosis.3 It is 
not clear whether such changes in incidence reflect new 
patterns of psychopathology or are simply consequences 
of different diagnostic “popularities.”4 In a review of his-
torical and current psychopathological evidence of BPD, 
we have claimed that it is nearly impossible to distin-
guish BPD from the schizophrenia spectrum disorders, 
especially schizotypal personality disorder (SPD).5 Two 
BPD criteria, ie, identity disturbance and chronic feelings 
of emptiness, distinguish (together with self-mutilating 
behavior) BPD from all other personality disorders. 
Unfortunately, these criteria remain insufficiently defined. 
What is it like to have an “unstable self-image or sense of 
self” or to experience “chronic feelings of emptiness”? 
Importantly, these symptoms are consistently found in 
the classical and recent literature on schizophrenia spec-
trum disorders.
The aim of this article is to examine the phenome-
nological nature of the concept of identity disturbance 
and feelings of emptiness and to clarify their diagnostic 
significance with respect to the differential diagnosis 
between BPD and the schizophrenia spectrum. After a 
historical outline of the criteria, we present a phenome-
nological explication of the concepts of identity and self  
and introduce a distinction between “core” and “narra-
tive” selfhood that may be differential diagnostically use-
ful. Finally, we present and discuss a clinical case with 
diverging diagnostic perspectives.
The Vicissitudes of Diagnostic Terms
The DSM and ICD diagnostic criteria of identity distur-
bance and feelings of emptiness appear in table 1. While 
there are no descriptions of the experiential quality of 
feelings of emptiness, identity disturbance is described in 
terms of uncertainty concerning career choices, values, 
goals, and friendship patterns. In the DSM-IV,6 the con-
cept of “a sense of self” appears for the first time but is 
undefined. Instead, we find this term as part of the defi-
nition of identity in DSM-III (table 1). Noteworthy, this 
definition links disturbance of identity also to schizo-
phrenia. DSM-IV and DSM-IV-TR7 have no definitions 
of “identity” and none of the DSM editions offer a def-
inition of the term “self.” The formulation of diagnostic 
criteria is remarkably poor in ICD-10.8 In the alternative 
model for personality disorders, included in Section III 
in DSM-5, “identity” and “self-direction” form a “self  
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functioning severity dimension,” providing a more elab-
orate description of identity disturbance, yet still without 
any additional clarification of the term “self.”
Psychoanalytic Roots of Disturbed Identity and 
Feelings of Emptiness
In the pre-DSM-III literature, the concept of “border-
line” was typically considered a variant of schizophrenia.5 
Many contributions came from psychoanalysts, describ-
ing identity disturbance and feelings of emptiness as re-
flecting disturbances at a structural level of the psyche. 
In their terminology, “structure” may refer both to the 
overall psychic structures in Freud’s model of the id, ego, 
and superego but also to single mental structures or pro-
cesses such as defensive or cognitive functions.
In the most influential article on the subject, Deutsch10 
described a group of patients with what she termed “as 
if” personalities, referring to the patient’s readiness to 
mold oneself  according to the surroundings and antici-
pating the widely used characteristic of borderline 
patients as having a chameleon-like adaptability to oth-
ers.11,12 Deutsch found that her patients were not aware of 
their “as if” personality. Rather they felt an inner emp-
tiness, which they tried to overcome by an exaggerated 
identification with others. Notably, Deutsch considered 
these patients to belong to the schizophrenia spectrum.
The DSM criterion on identity disturbance has its 
root in the psychoanalytic concept of “identity diffu-
sion.” Erikson13 defines the term “identity” as expressing 
“a mutual relation in that it connotes both a persistent 
sameness within oneself  (self-sameness) and a persistent 
sharing of some kind of essential character with others” 
(p. 57). “Identity diffusion,” on the other hand, manifest 
in various features such as a disintegration of the sense of 
inner continuity and sameness, difficulties in committing 
to occupational choices, and difficulties with intimacy. 
The main figure formulating identity diffusion as a key 
pathology in borderline patients was Kernberg,14,15 who 
synthesized (and modified) the constructs of several of 
his predecessors.13,16–20 Kernberg12 refers to identity diffu-
sion as “the lack of an integrated self  concept and an 
integrated and stable concept of total objects in relation-
ship with the self” (p. 39). Contradictory self  and object 
images are permanently split rather than being synthe-
sized into a more coherent image. This formulation (ap-
parently kept on a sub-personal [unconscious] level) draws 
on Klein’s description of the mechanism of “splitting” 
and the association between excessive splitting and a dis-
turbance in “the feeling of the ego,” which she believed 
to be the roots of some forms of schizophrenia.16 With 
respect to the more experiential level, ie, the level of phe-
nomenal symptoms, Kernberg21 finds identity diffusion 
to be reflected in the patients’ incapacity to give an in-
tegrated description of self  and significant others. They 
are uncertain about their major interests, their behavior 
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patterns are chaotic, and their commitments to work and 
other people are unstable.
Kernberg’s concept of borderline personality organiza-
tion includes patients with schizoid, paranoid, narcissistic, 
hypomanic, and antisocial personalities, impulse-ridden 
character disorders,22 “as if” personalities,10 psychotic 
characters,23 inadequate personalities, and patients with 
multiple sexual deviations—in other words, a number of 
“categories” many of which were considered to be affili-
ated with schizophrenia. The capacity for reality testing 
and the relative intact ego boundaries in patients with 
borderline personality organization are what delimit 
these patients from the psychoses.
Feelings of emptiness have been described within a va-
riety of conditions, including psychoses,24 depression,25 
schizoid,26,27 narcissistic,28 and borderline personality.12 In 
this literature, one may encounter descriptions of a sense 
of deadness or absence of inner feelings; of unrespon-
siveness; of boredom and superficiality; of depersonali-
zation. Such experiences may be fluctuating, episodic, or 
chronic.29 Typically, feelings of emptiness in borderline 
patients have been considered the experiential conse-
quence of a disturbance in some sort of feeling or sense 
of self,30,31 eg, described as a continuum of experiences 
from “a sense of incompleteness, vagueness, a search for 
‘one’s being’” to a psychotic conviction of “actual per-
sonal extinction or nonexistence.”32 (p. 471)
Kernberg12 described how namely patients with identity 
diffusion experience various forms of emptiness depend-
ing on the pathological structure of personality. Patients 
with a schizoid personality may experience emptiness as 
an “innate quality that makes them different from other 
people” (p. 215) and here the experience of emptiness is 
related to phenomena such as apathy and anhedonia. 
In patients with a narcissistic personality, the feeling of 
emptiness is moreover characterized by “strong feelings 
of boredom and restlessness” (p. 217), resulting from the 
potential lack of gratification from others.
Although rich in theoretical and clinical perspectives 
on borderline patients, the psychoanalytic approach has 
been difficult to translate into descriptive diagnostic cri-
teria (table 1) and is characterized by diverging theoret-
ical perspectives. Most importantly, descriptions of the 
experiential (phenomenal) level of psychopathology are 
often conflated with complex meta-psychological con-
structs, which concern a sub-personal (unconscious) level 
of pathology. This is evident in Erikson’s13 view on iden-
tity as referring to (1) “a conscious sense of individual 
identity,” (2) “an unconscious striving for a continuity of 
personal character,” (3) “a criterion for the silent doings 
of ego synthesis,” and (4) “an inner solidarity with a 
group’s ideals and identity” (p. 57). Similarly, Kernberg 
introduces a self concept, referring to “the integration of 
representations of the self.”21 Does this refer to the per-
son’s beliefs about him-/herself, which can be linguisti-
cally expressed and thematized? Or is it a sub-personal, 
unconscious, dispositional structure that only occasion-
ally becomes materialized as a belief  about oneself, eg, 
through psychotherapy?
Identity, Self, and the Schizophrenia Spectrum
Descriptions of a disturbance of identity or sense of self  
in schizophrenia spectrum conditions are as old as the 
concept of schizophrenia itself. Bleuler33 reports a patient 
who “is not really herself, she is merely a reflection of 
herself” (p.  145) while other patients report that they 
“can’t catch up with themselves” or that they “have lost 
their individual self” (p.  143). Bleuler considered these 
disorders as part of the fundamental symptoms of schiz-
ophrenia (including also formal thought disorder, disor-
der of affectivity, anhedonia, ambivalence, and autism). 
When Bleuler claimed that the essential feature of schiz-
ophrenia was a peculiar “alteration of thinking, feeling 
and relation to the external world which appears nowhere 
else in this particular fashion” (p. 9), or when Jaspers34 
talked about “process phenomena” inaccessible to psy-
chological understanding, they seem to indicate a con-
frontation with the illness features that are located at a 
structural level of experience.35 Briefly, this level concerns 
the “how” of the experience rather than the “what” (the 
content) of experience. During the last 15 years, these dis-
turbances have been conceptualized as structural changes 
of the patient’s self, operating at a non-thematic level 
of consciousness (the “ipseity disturbance model”36,37). 
A series of phenomenologically inspired empirical stud-
ies have demonstrated a selective hyper-aggregation of 
structural-experiential self-disorders in schizophrenia 
and schizotypal disorders,38–40 which occur in the pre-
onset conditions41,42 and tend to persist over the course 
of illness.43,44 Such disturbances were in fact part of the 
schizophrenia definition in the ICD-8 and ICD-9, stating 
that schizophrenia entails “a fundamental disturbance 
of personality […that] involves its most basic functions, 
those that give the normal person his feeling of individu-
ality, uniqueness, and self-direction”45 (p. 27).
In the pre-DSM-III era, the experiential self-disorders 
were emphasized in articles on “pseudoneurotic schizo-
phrenia,”11,46 referring to patients with temporally unsta-
ble clinical pictures and fluctuation of seemingly neurotic 
symptoms in the presence of fundamental schizophrenia 
symptomatology. Examples of the latter were experiences 
of anhedonia, apathy, and of feeling “dead and empty.”
In his existential-phenomenological study of schizoid 
and schizophrenic persons (including also “borderline 
cases”), Laing47 described their experiences of a lack of 
autonomous identity, personal consistency, and temporal 
continuity. They usually experience their “self” as disem-
bodied, and they feel empty, unreal, dead, and differenti-
ated from the world. They are unable to sustain a sense 
of self  as persons, which is why they are equally unable to 
experience neither separateness from nor relatedness to 
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others in a usual way. They may fear losing their identity 
in a relationship as well as feel dependent on the other for 
their very being.
Identity and Self: Conceptual Considerations
Personal identity and selfhood are a perennial topic of 
philosophy. In a common sense psychological under-
standing, personal identity refers to a set of persisting 
features that identify and individuate a person. If  asked 
on the street “who are you?” a by-passer may answer “I 
am John Smith” and he may proceed with a list of bio-
graphical, characterological and cognitive characteris-
tics. In this type of understanding, we pay no attention 
to the structure or form (the “how”) of the underlying 
experience.
The French philosopher Paul Ricoeur48 characterized 
personal identity as emerging in the triangle of idem-
identity (sameness), ipse-identity (selfhood) and inter-
personal relations. Idem-identity, or sameness, refers to 
persisting yet malleable personal features such as person-
ality traits, character, temperamental dispositions, and 
values, which change over the span of life in our social 
interactions. All these features may be expressed in lin-
guistic (propositional) terms and may be contemplated 
upon in self-reflection.
The sameness of the changing idem-identity is assured 
by the selfhood or ipse-identity (ipse = self or itself). The 
who or the elusive subjectivity of experience remains per-
sistent over the lifespan and is exemplified by Ricoeur with 
the notion of keeping a promise: If I keep a promise made 
when I was 20 years old until I am 80, the keeper of the 
promise is the who of personal identity. The who or the first-
person perspective is usually never a theme or object of 
conscious awareness and attention but simply a tacit struc-
ture of experience. Contemporary phenomenology and 
cognitive science make an analogous distinction between 
the “narrative” self and the “minimal”49–51 or “core/basic” 
self.52,53 The notion of core self refers to the first-personal 
manifestation of all experience, ie, an experience is never 
anonymous but manifests always itself as my experience. 
In other words, our experiencing articulates itself in the 
first-person perspective, involving a persisting sense of self-
presence as an abiding implicit feeling of “I-me-myself”54 
(perhaps also addressed by Erikson in his description of 
self-sameness). The core self implies a sense of self-coin-
cidence, privacy of our inner world and the “me/not me” 
demarcation, psychosomatic unity (embodiment), and an 
experience of one’s being as “having begun in or around 
birth and liable to extinction with death.”47 (p. 42)
It is upon this core self  that the narrative self  is devel-
oped in social and linguistic interactions. The core self  is 
a prerequisite of the narrative self.50,55 It implies the who 
(in Ricoeur’s term) for a person to be introverted, ambi-
tious, friendly. In normal experience, the structure and 
the content of experience are interwoven and the struc-
ture of experience usually does not become the object of 
our reflection (ie, the object of experience). The by-passer 
John Smith mentioned above would probably not include 
in his answer to us that he is experiencing the world in 
the first-person perspective. Patients with schizophrenia, 
however, can describe such structural disturbances of self-
experience, eg, various distortions of first-person perspec-
tive, incomplete sense of substantiality-embodiment, and 
an ephemeral sense of self-presence.55 In psychopathol-
ogy, there may be disturbances at either one or both levels 
of selfhood, though also in a clinical setting these levels 
may not be easy to differentiate. Usually, disturbance of 
the structural level of selfhood, entailing an instability 
of the basic subject-world relation, will also manifest as 
disturbance of narrative features, including interpersonal 
functioning, emotional regulation, and direction in life. 
However, disturbance of the narrative level of selfhood 
will not in itself  cause structural disorders of the core self. 
Being confused about career choice or being impulsive 
typically does not entail problems with demarcation or 
self-presence (see also the clinical vignette below).
The criterion of chronic feelings of emptiness may be 
informed by the distinction between core self  and narra-
tive self. Currently, the criterion is left without any guid-
ance regarding the experiential level; possibly, the term 
“chronic” is an attempt to capture the existential (trait) 
quality of this symptom. At the narrative level of self-
hood, feelings of emptiness may emanate from a lack of 
interests, values, and directions in life. At the level of core 
self, however, the emptiness may be related to a feeling 
of being ontologically different from others, described in 
the schizophrenia literature as “Anderssein.”56 This con-
cept does not refer to the feeling of being different at a 
personal or narrative level (eg, being brighter, taller or 
more interested in football than others), but to the feel-
ing that one’s very being is different (similar to Kernberg’s 
description of an “innate quality” of being different from 
others). When emanating from structural disturbances 
of core self, feelings of emptiness may also be related to, 
eg, a distorted first-person perspective with a pervasive 
loss of “mineness” or to different forms of depersonaliza-
tion. What apparently is a metaphoric expression of the 
patient (“feeling empty inside”) may in fact be an expres-
sion of a very concrete experience of being hollow.
As mentioned above, the features of narrative selfhood 
can be consciously represented but also the features of 
the core self  are phenomenally accessible when we reflect 
upon the way in which we experience something. Thus, 
neither the concept of narrative or core self  appeals to 
certain unconscious or sub-personal structures or mecha-
nisms, and this possibility of phenomenological descrip-
tions makes these concepts useful in psychopathology. 
Below, we will demonstrate their utility in a clinical 
vignette.
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A Clinical Vignette
Amanda, 23, single, high school degree with good marks. 
Since then, she has been ambivalent about her future 
education and dropped out of 2 university programs. 
She lives in a dormitory and is on a sick leave. She was 
admitted to a psychiatric facility 1 year ago after her sec-
ond suicide attempt. At this admission, she reported a 
tendency to act impulsively and mentioned occasional 
episodes of cutting herself. She described herself  as some-
times agitated and restless and with difficulties sustaining 
relations. She felt “depressed,” without energy, cried a lot 
without knowing any reason, and did not attend school.
During the research interview, she reported feeling 
different from her peers during childhood as if  she was 
somehow “not on the same side” as them. In adolescence, 
this feeling has intensified and changed into a vague sense 
of uniqueness or superiority, perhaps being “brighter” 
than other people. However, she does not think that she is 
more intelligent than others are but that she perhaps has 
a better insight into the conditions of human existence. 
This sense of difference may change into a feeling as if  in 
a bubble and not truly part of the world.
She has no idea who she is. When trying to describe 
herself, the only adjectives that come to her mind are 
“lazy” and “energetic.” She cannot point to any specific 
personal values, preferences, or interests. Her “person-
ality” solely depends on the role she chooses to take. 
When looking in a mirror, she sometimes has a feel-
ing as if  looking at an unfamiliar person. At times, her 
thoughts and feelings become somehow anonymous 
and “free flowing” as if  not truly related to her. She also 
describes how her memories feel detached from her, as if  
her childhood was not her own but someone else’s child-
hood. She wonders whether she is transsexual, or if  the 
reason why she is so confused about her identity is be-
cause she should have been a boy instead of  a girl. She 
also wonders if  she is perhaps homosexual without hav-
ing recognized this (she feels sexually attracted only by 
men). She plans to consult a clairvoyant in order to get a 
better grip about herself.
Her lack of identity feels as a sort of emptiness, “there 
is nothing inside of me, nothing like a soul or anything.” 
She describes this emptiness as “a black hole” and as “a 
gap” in the middle of her chest. She senses this gap in a 
concrete way, specifying its size. Previously, she felt that 
the hole became smaller when having a boyfriend, but it 
was always there. Then she tried having 2 boyfriends at 
the same time, but this did not help either. Now she won-
ders if  she needs to have several simultaneous boyfriends 
in order to make it disappear.
The feeling of emptiness is linked to a feeling of not 
being at one with her body. She experiences her body only 
as “a tool,” which is there in order for her “to walk from 
A to B.” Her thoughts and feelings are in her head; her 
body is empty. At the peak of such experiences, she feels 
a sort of painful restlessness and anxiety without auto-
nomic symptoms. She describes her “self” in a concrete 
sense as being outside of her body. She feels as a “fluent 
existence,” as a “fluent blob” in the air instead of a whole 
person. She reports her “I” as being so blurry that she 
sometimes thinks she cannot even die because there is no 
“core” that can be “taken out of the game.” When walk-
ing on the street, she may experience that strangers stare 
at her and she wonders whether it is because that they can 
see that she is empty.
The patient was diagnosed with BPD on the basis of 
identity disturbance with unclear goals, feelings of emp-
tiness, indications of unstable affectivity and mood, 
self-mutilating acts, and disturbance of interpersonal 
relations. Her episodes of depression were seen as con-
sistent with the BPD diagnosis. She undoubtedly fulfills 
the DSM-5 BPD criteria on their face value. However, 
she also fulfills the criteria for SPD.
It is quite clear that the identity problem is the cen-
tral feature of this clinical picture, affecting the patient’s 
interpersonal life and educational career. This is evident 
on the level of what we have called narrative selfhood, eg, 
she reports that she has no personal values, preferences or 
interests. However, her identity problems seem not only 
to be located at the level of narrative selfhood but also 
to entail disturbances of a very basic and structural level 
of experience. For example, she experiences a pervasive 
sense of diminished or insecure self-presence: she has 
no abiding and substantial feelings of an “I/me/myself.” 
She expresses a fundamental (ontological) difference 
from others (“Anderssein”). Her first-person perspective 
becomes distorted with the ensuing anonymization of 
thought processes and memories, which sometimes loose 
the character of “mineness.” Her ambivalence and lack 
of direction in life, which are manifest on the narrative 
level of selfhood, are in our view linked to her perva-
sively diminished sense of self-presence or even existence. 
In fact, she describes a fundamental loss of centrality 
of being (eg, she feels as a fluent blob in the air). From 
this perspective, it is the disturbance of the core self  that 
infuses her narrative identity with instability and a feel-
ing of always playing a role. She describes further dis-
turbances of the core self, comprising spatialization of 
experience (eg, she senses her emptiness in a very concrete 
spatialized manner) and a loss of the ordinarily unprob-
lematic sense of psychophysical unity or embodiment (in 
fact, her episodes of cutting were motivated by feelings of 
anhedonia and deadness in the body). Her thought pro-
cesses reveal a tolerance for contradictions (“lazy” and 
“energetic”) and psychosis-near reasoning (eg, increasing 
number of boyfriends would diminish her sense of empti-
ness). In sum, the patient presents a range of disorders of 
the core self  characteristic of the schizophrenia spectrum 
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disorders with clear consequences on the level of narra-
tive identity.
Discussion
In our opinion, identity disturbance and feelings of emp-
tiness play a significant role in the differential diagno-
sis of schizophrenia spectrum and BPD. However, the 
definitions of these criteria are disconnected from any 
overarching psychopathological context and thus open 
to multiple interpretations. Moreover, although distur-
bances of core self  have been consistently described as 
a constitutive feature of the schizophrenia spectrum,57 a 
reference to such disturbances in schizophrenia appears 
only in the DSM-III (Glossary of Technical Terms) and 
is entirely absent in the subsequent editions of the DSM. 
This leaves clinicians with BPD as the most obvious diag-
nosis for patients describing disturbance in their “sense 
of self.” Interestingly, the proposal for a definition of 
schizophrenia in ICD-11 includes the notion of a distur-
bance of self-experience.58
The distinction between form (structure) and con-
tent of psychopathological phenomena, which Jaspers 
emphasized already 100 years ago, is in our view crucial 
with respect to differentiating disorders of personality 
from the schizophrenia spectrum, and BPD from SPD in 
particular. In this context, we find a distinction between 
the “narrative” and the “core” self  useful. Importantly, 
the structural changes of the core self—located on pre-
reflective levels of consciousness and therefore usually 
not an object of folk psychological reflection—are, as 
mentioned, experientially accessible and lend themselves 
to description and classification.59 Today’s frequency of 
the BPD diagnosis may also be linked to restrictive crite-
ria for schizophrenia, emphasizing psychotic symptoms 
of high severity levels.3,5 The BPD and SPD diagnoses 
(the latter only infrequently used) probably diagnose the 
subthreshold patients which would typically meet the 
ICD-8 and ICD-9 criteria for schizophrenia, including 
the pseudoneurotic pictures.60,61
In conclusion, we believe that the current task of psy-
chiatry is to regain its interest in psychopathology and 
refine its concepts and descriptions.62 Such orientation 
may counteract an increasing skepticism about pheno-
typic classification.63
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